We find that competition from payday lenders leads depository institutions to raise overdraft fees and reduce the availability of "free" checking accounts. We attribute this rise in prices partly to adverse selection created by banks' practice of charging a flat fee regardless of the overdraft amount-pricing that favors depositors prone to large overdrafts. Payday credit is priced per dollar borrowed, so when that option is available, depositors prone to small overdrafts switch. That selection works against banks; large overdrafts cost more to supply and, if depositors default, banks lose more, so prices rise. Consistent with this adverse selection hypothesis, we document that the average dollar amount per returned check at banks and other depository institutions increases when depositors have access to payday credit. Our findings illuminate competition and pricing frictions in the large, yet largely unstudied, small-dollar loan market.
I. Introduction
The small-dollar consumer loan market we study pits two very different competitors against one another. On the one side are mainstream banks and credit unions that supply overdraft credit whenever they cover check, ATM, or debit card transactions that would have overdrawn depositors' account otherwise. On the other side are payday lenders who cash and hold customers' personal checks for about two weeks, providing the check-writer with $50 to $500 of credit in the interim.
Although much maligned for its high prices, payday credit can be cheaper than overdraft credit. The median price for overdraft credit in 2006 was a flat $27 per overdraft (FDIC 2008) .
The typical price for payday credit is $15 per $100 of credit. Given two weeks of credit at those prices, payday credit is cheaper than overdraft credit for overdrafts below $180. Our paper investigates how the availability of payday credit affects overdraft fees and the supply of "free" checking accounts, the base good with which overdraft services are bundled. We estimate the effect of payday credit using two different identification schemes. The first, following Morgan and Strain (2008) , compares how outcomes change as states switch from allowing to prohibiting payday credit, or vice versa. The second, following Melzer (2009) , focuses on states that prohibit payday credit, and compares outcomes at institutions located near the border of a state that allows payday credit with outcomes at institutions located further from such a border. The identifying assumption for the first scheme is that legal changes within states are independent of overdraft outcomes, a plausible, if arguable, assumption. The identifying assumption for the second scheme is that the payday laws and location of intermediaries in one state are independent of laws in neighboring states, a less arguable assumption it strikes us.
Importantly, the identifying assumptions of these two models are independent, which strengthens the overall research design.
Except perhaps in the most concentrated deposit markets, we find that banks and other depository institutions raise fees on overdraft credit and reduce the supply "free" checking accounts when payday credit is available. The changes are similar in both models, and are economically meaningful; the price of overdraft credit increases by $1, or 4 percent, and the likelihood of "free" checking falls by 5 percent.
Although we entertain other explanations for our findings, we attribute them partly to adverse selection created by the curious flat-fee pricing of overdraft credit. According to the FDIC 2008 (Table IV .2 p. 14), 98.4 percent of depository institutions charge per overdraft. White (2007) contends that banks eschew charging explicit interest to avoid regulation as credit and hence, usury limits. Banks may also want to avoid the adverse publicity that quadruple digit interest rates might incite. 2 Flat fee ("buffet-style") pricing of overdraft credit disadvantages depositors prone to small overdrafts, and so exposes overdraft providers to adverse selection.
Once payday credit priced ala carte becomes available, depositors prone to smaller overdrafts switch, saddling banks and credit unions with proportionately more depositors prone to large overdrafts. That adverse selection increases costs to overdraft providers in two ways; funding large overdrafts costs more, and if the credit is not repaid, lenders lose more. Higher costs imply higher prices.
The adverse selection hypothesis implies that overdraft attempts should fall in number, but rise in average dollar amount when payday credit is available. Using data from Federal
Reserve check processing centers, we confirm these predictions for a subset of overdraft attempts: returned checks, which are overdraft attempts that depositories refuse to pay. We extend and confirm Morgan and Strain's (2008) finding that returned checks are fewer when payday loans are allowed. In addition, we find that average amount of a returned check increases by 15% when payday loans are available. In combination, we believe that these facts are compelling evidence in favor of the adverse selection hypothesis.
A final, auxiliary finding provides indirect support for the adverse selection hypothesis:
when payday credit is available, depositories reduce the availability of "free" checking accounts only for accounts without direct deposit. That selective tightening may represent risk management; expecting that customers who demand "free" checking without direct deposit may be anticipating large, unpaid overdrafts, depositories limit the supply of free checking without direct deposit.
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The interactions between overdraft providers and payday lenders may be a case where a competing class of firms educates myopic consumers about the hidden fees ("shrouded attributes") associated with another firms' product, an issue studied by Gabaix and Laibson 3 The credit model in Riordan (1993) predicts competition in banking per se can increase risk and lead banks to tighten underwriting for two reasons. First, competition may degrade the quality of information banks use to screen borrowers, so more bad loans are made. Second, concerns about the winners' curse-the fact that banks may overbid (underprice) credit---will lead them to tighten underwriting standards.
(2006).
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Whereas depository institutions may have no incentive to reveal the hidden overdraft fees associated with "free" checking, payday lenders might.
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On that point, it is interesting to note how aggressively payday lenders have publicized the results of the FDIC (2008) study of the costs and usage of overdraft credit.
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As a complement to the growing literature about payday credit and consumer outcomes (Morse (2008), Morgan and Strain (2008) , Melzer (2009), Skiba and Tobacman (2008) , Carrell and Zinman 2008)), our work studies the effect of payday credit on the price of other types of credit. Fusaro (2008) also studies the cost of overdraft credit, but does not investigate its determinants. Hannan (2006) and Deyoung and Phillips (2009) analyze price competition for short-term credit within the banking and payday markets, respectively, but do not look at competition across the two industries. Finally, our work also bears some relation to an emerging industrial organization literature on price-increasing competition. Chen and Riordan (2008) show that competition between two differentiated products can increase each product's price in "non-exceptional" theoretical circumstances and cite evidence of price-increasing competition in two markets, food and drugs.
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Our paper finds price-increasing competition in a third market.
Section II compares overdraft and payday credit and makes the case, based on prices and usage patterns, that they are at least partial substitutes. Section III describes the exit and entry of payday lenders that constitute the "experiments" we use to study overdraft and deposit outcomes.
Section IV presents the main result-price-increasing competition-revealed by those 4 Indeed, they use "free" bank accounts and overdraft fees as leading examples of shrouded attributes. See footnote 22 in Gabaix and Laibson (2006) . 5 Within the "shrouded attributes" model, banks can earn more by keeping overdraft terms hidden, because informed customers will avoid the add-on or switch to another bank. Payday lenders offer only the checking account add-on, or credit in this case, so they are not subject to the same customer loss when they inform their customers about overdraft terms. 6 For example: http://www.approvedcashadvance.com/images/highlights_fdic_bank_overdraft_programs.pdf 7 Perloff, Suslow, and Seguin 2005; Ward et al. 2002; Thomadsen 2005 experiments. Section V presents auxiliary findings suggesting that adverse selection created by crudely (flat) priced overdraft is partly responsible the price-increasing competition we find.
Section VI concludes by discussing implications for consumer welfare, policy, and future research.
II. Overdraft and Payday Credit
This section describes the two main players in the small-dollar loan market and compares the pricing and usage of their services. The key points are: overdraft and payday credit are partial substitutes; payday credit may be cheaper than overdraft credit; and both payday lenders and overdraft credit providers depend on revenues from repeat borrowing by core customers.
II.1 Overdraft Credit
Sometime in the 1990s financial advisory firms began marketing trade-marked, computer algorithms designed to automate and optimize depository institutions' (DI) traditionally ad hoc overdraft decisions. Forty percent of all banks surveyed operated automated overdraft programs. Over three-fourths of large banks (asset > $ 5 billion) had automated overdraft of one sort or another.
The study shows that depository institutions offer a full "suite" of overdraft credit, ranging from lines of credit (LOC), arguably the top-of-the line, to automated discretionary overdraft protection, more familiarly known as bounce "protection," the variety we study. Payday credit underwriting is minimal; applicants must prove that they have a checking account and a job. The checking account pre-requisite makes checking accounts and payday credit partial complements, implying positive correlation in the individual demand for each.
Given a deposit account, however, payday credit and overdraft credit are substitutes, implying negative correlation in their individual demand. As we discuss later, that asymmetric technological relationship might help account for some of our findings.
III. Entry and Exit by Payday Lenders as "Experiments"
Because of the controversy surrounding payday credit, the state laws governing it have been in flux. Following Melzer (2009) and Morgan and Strain (2008) , we use those fluctuations to identify plausibly, or at least arguably, exogenous variation in payday credit supply. We identify fluctuations or differences in regulation in 13 states. The appendix documents the regulatory differences in detail. 
Our identifying assumption is that political-economy decisions driving changes in
Allowed are exogenous with respect to outcomes. While that assumption may be arguable, we find it plausible given the absence of any evidence to the contrary.
The 2 nd availability measure is actually a sequence of distance-based indicators.
Access_X_Y cy , is a county-year level indicator equal to one if an institution is located in a county whose center is within X and Y miles of a state that allows payday lending (zero if not).
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For example, Access_0_10 equals one if an institution is in a county located 10 miles or less from a state that allows payday loans, and zero otherwise. Access_10_20 and Access_20_30 are defined analogously. The omitted category is Access_30_plus.
Note that Access varies only in states that prohibit payday lending.
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Its effect is identified by comparing outcomes at institutions relatively near states that allow payday credit to 15 We use the county center because we do not know the exact location of institution within the county. 16 The 13 states that prohibit payday lending for some time during the sample period are: CT, DC, GA, MA, MD, NC, NH, NJ, NY, OR, PA, VT, WV.
outcomes at more remote institutions. The identifying assumption is that the distance between institution i and a state where payday credit is allowed is exogenous with respect to overdraft terms at institution i, a weaker assumption than needed for Allowed.
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The institutional and county characteristics defined by Allowed and Access differ in a few ways (Table 3) . States with changes in Allowed have higher proportions of Hispanics and blacks, and relatively more savings banks (versus commercial banks). Savings banks are also overrepresented (relative to commercial banks) in counties without access to payday credit (Access_0_10 =1). Unemployment rates are significantly lower in those counties as well.
Importantly, our regression analysis controls for those differences by including institution and county-level controls.
IV. Data and Results

IV.1. Data
The data on overdraft prices and "free" checking were provided to us by Moebs $ervices of Lake Bluff, Illinois which collected the data through a telephone survey.
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Moebs draws a random sample of institutions -stratified by region, asset size and institution type -and calls each institution's main branch to assess fees charged to customers at that specific location.
19 17 Our identifying assumption requires, firstly, that payday credit regulations in bordering states are uncorrelated with characteristics of the overdraft market across the border, and secondly, that depositories do not locate based on payday credit availability in some way that alters the composition of depositories near the border. To weaken the latter assumption, we control for the institution type, institution size (log assets), and the concentration of the local deposit market. Also reassuring is that Moebs almost always surveys the main branch, a location that was typically determined long before payday lenders arrived on the scene. 18 Moebs $ervices is an economic research firm focused on the financial services market. Textbook theory implies β < 0, but given our adverse selection hypothesis, we reserve the possibility of β > 0. we include the interaction Allowed*HHI, indicates that access to payday credit increases overdraft fees the most in competitive deposit markets. Based on the point estimates, payday availability decreases overdraft fees in concentrated markets, with an HHI above 0.6, a level three times the average HHI for overall the sample.
The Free Checking regressions indicate depository institutions are less likely to offer free checking accounts when depositors have access to payday credit. Allowed is negative and significant in models (5) -(6) which includes the model with census division-year fixed effects.
The smallest estimate on Allowed, in model (5), implies depositories in states that allow payday lending are five percentage points less likely to supply free checking.
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Before discussing the results, we confirm that they hold using an entirely different measure of payday credit availability. 26 Since Free Checking is binary, this model assumes linear probability; we relax that assumption in a robustness exercise.
IV.3. Findings with Access
A potential concern with Allowed is that states endogenously liberalize their payday lending laws as OD fees increase, leading to a biased estimate. Using Access reduces those concerns; the identifying variation in Access does not depend on law changes in the institution's home state.
The regression model is:
Apart from replacing Allowed with Access, model (B) differs from (A) in two ways. First, (B) includes a state-year effect (instead of state and year effects) to isolate variation in Access that is unrelated to the state-level changes payday availability captured by (A). Second, some specifications of (B) include Border, a dummy indicating whether an institution is located in a county within 25 miles of a state border. Border controls for general differences between institutions located near a state border and more interior counties. To improve precision of the estimates we include all observations in the regression sample, but the identifying variation in Access comes from institutions in the thirteen states that prohibit payday lending at some time during the sample. Table 6 reports regression estimates. We observe the same significant differences across types of institutions and size of institution as with regression model (A). Market concentration (HHI) is insignificant, as before.
The main results with Access are very similar to those with Allowed. Given county characteristics and type of institution, depository institutions are about 9 percentage points less likely to offer free checking if payday credit is accessible within 10 miles, with no discernible effect at greater distances. Overdraft fees are significantly higher when payday credit is accessible. These estimates are very close to the earlier estimates; given the type and size of institutions and other controls, overdraft fees are $1.48 higher when payday credit is available within 10 miles. Access beyond ten miles does not significantly affect overdraft prices. As with Allowed, Access seems to have a larger effect on OD fees in low-HHI deposit markets, but the estimated coefficient on the HHI interaction term is quite imprecise. Table 8 confirms the results of model (B) using a continuous measure, LogDistance, instead of Access. A one percent increase in the distance to a state that allows payday credit increases the probability that Free Checking is available by four percentage points and decreases OD fees about 50 cents.
IV.4. Robustness
V.1. Adverse Selection and Other Possible Explanations
How do we explain our finding of price-increasing competition? One might wonder if we are confusing cause and effect; perhaps rising overdraft prices within a state (endogenously) motivate legislators to permit payday credit? However, our second identification is less subject to that objection. It seems implausible that the regulatory decisions in one state are driven by the overdraft conditions in counties in neighboring states, and, at that, only by those counties within 10 miles of the border, as we find.
Could access to payday credit drive up prices by increasing demand for overdraft credit?
That prediction follows from the "debt trap" hypothesis against payday credit, the proposition that prohibitively expensive payday loans aggravate their users already strained financial condition and drives them to demand still more credit, including, perhaps, overdraft credit.
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However, Morgan and Strain (2008) document that returned checks rates fall when payday credit is available. That finding, which we confirm and extend below, suggests access to payday credit reduces demand for overdraft credit, at least by some account holders.
Our findings could reflect the theoretical counter-effects of competition predicted by Chen and Riordan (2008) . Analyzing a monopoly-duopoly model where consumers make discrete choices between differentiated products, they show that the customary downward pressure on prices from entry (as firms "defend" lost market share) may be offset by upward pressure arising because the duopolist's remaining customers are less price-elastic. While those effects could be operating here, we do not have any direct evidence for them.
Where we can provide direct evidence is for the adverse selection hypothesis. That hypothesis, again, is that the flat-fee pricing of overdraft credit discriminates against depositors prone to small overdrafts so they switch to payday credit when available while depositors prone to large overdrafts stick with banks and credit unions. That adverse selection hypothesis implies that the average amount per overdraft should increase when payday credit is available.
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We test this prediction using data on returned checks, a subset of overdraft attempts, from Federal
Reserve Regional Check Processing Centers (CPC). Summary statistics are reported in Table 9 . The average rate of returned checks per number processed is 1.26 percent. The mean dollar amount per returned item is $872 and the median amount is $758. Those amounts are larger by an order of magnitude than the means and medians in FDIC (2008), presumably because the FDIC counted all overdrafts, protected or not, while our data only cover unprotected overdrafts; risk-averse banks may hesitate to cover $800 overdrafts.
The returned check regression results are reported in Table 10 . Model (1) indicates that the returned check rate per checks processed, the measure more closely associated with small dollar check writers, declines when payday lending is allowed. Returned checks per dollar processed tends downward (Model 2), but the decline is not statistically significant. Those results confirm Morgan and Strain (2008) . Model (3) indicates that the amount per returned check rises when payday lending is permitted (significant at the ten percent level). The average amount per return increases by $130 dollar when payday lending is permitted, an increase of 15 percent relative to average.
The returned check regressions seem consistent with the adverse selection hypothesis.
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When payday credit is available, depositors prone to frequently bouncing small checks may switch to less expensive payday loans. The depositors that do not switch are prone to bouncing larger checks, where overdraft is not such a bad deal.
V.2. Free Checking With Direct Deposit & Without
Recall that "free" checking is less available when payday credit is available. That finding might partly reflect that a checking account is a complement, pre-requisite actually, for payday credit, so their demand is positively correlated. While granting that possibility, we conjecture it also has to do with the possibility that "free" checking is less profitable to depository institutions when payday credit is available to depositors. Depository institutions may use "free" checking as loss leader that is compensated for by expected revenue from overdrafts. If payday credit helps depositors avoid overdrafts, the loss leader becomes a money loser. That logic predicts the decline in "free" checking will be more pronounced for deposits without direct deposit.
Consistent with that prediction, the results in Table 11 show that payday credit availability affects only the supply of "free" checking accounts without direct deposit. Also observe that institutional differences in the main results-the greater propensity for credit unions and savings banks to supply "free" checking--is significant only for accounts without direct 31 In addition to changing the distribution of overdraft attempts, payday credit availability might also influence banks' policy of whether or not to cover an overdraft attempt. Changes in bank policy do not seem able to explain our findings that the average amount of returned checks increases when payday credit is available, however. To the extent banks are saddled with a riskier pool of overdrafters when payday loans are available, they would likely tighten standards and reduce the proportion of overdrafts paid, contrary to our results.
deposit. Credit unions and savings banks may rely more on overdrafts on accounts without direct deposit to compensate for providing "free" checking services.
V. Conclusion
Faced with competition from payday lenders, mainstream depository institutions charge higher overdraft fees and are less likely to offer "free" checking accounts without direct deposit.
We attribute this price-increasing competition at least partly to adverse selection. When payday credit price ala carte is available, the small dollar overdrafters disadvantaged by the buffet pricing of overdraft credit switch, saddling banks and other depositories with proportionately more higher cost, possibly riskier large-dollar overdrafts. Depository institutions raise prices and manage the extra risk by reducing the supply of free accounts without direct deposit.
How does the competition we study affect consumer and producer welfare? Banks, credit unions, and other depository institutions appear to lose when faced with competition from payday lenders as some of their core customers-depositors prone to small, perhaps repeated overdrafts-switch to payday lending and their remaining customers overdraw, and perhaps default, in larger amounts. The depositors who switch to payday lenders would also appear to gain, assuming they are making rational, informed choices. The losers, of course, are the customers who stick with bank overdraft at the new higher price.
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Without a model, we cannot calibrate the net welfare effect. However, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) use overdraft credit as the leading example of a "shrouded attribute," an expensive, overpriced feature of a good or service 32 Our findings might reconcile the salutary effects of payday access in Morgan and Strain (2007) with the inimical effects in Melzer (2009); perhaps Melzer (2009) is detecting the households which stick with (now higher priced) overdraft, while Morgan and Strain (2007) are picking up the households who select away from overdraft.
that is hidden from consumers. "Debiasing," that is, educating consumers by unshrouding hidden attributes, is welfare increasing.
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33 There is also a competing effect in shrouded attributes model. Shrouding only occurs when sophisticates can avoid the "add-on" at sufficiently low cost ("e"). The introduction of the substitute lowers "e" for sophisticates, making shrouding more likely, all else the same. In the context of overdraft, that implies banks are more likely to lower the price of the base good (the deposit), but charge higher add-on prices. We are finding higher add-on prices, but also higher base good prices. 0.37 0.12 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Reported are regression coefficients (robust, clustered standard errors) for models use LogDistance, the natual logarithm of the distance to the nearest allowing state) instead of Access_X_Y. 
